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Guest Editors’s Introduction: What’s Left of Asia
When we began organizing this special issue in 2003, we were motivated 
by two imperatives for rethinking “Asia.”1 One has a long history: the proj-
ect of rethinking Asia has infused the complex histories of struggles that 
defined and redefined what and how Asia means. The fluctuating mean-
ings and valences of Asia were particularly driven by Europe’s subjugation 
of regional empires and societies in Asia since the mid – nineteenth cen-
tury, which marked a watershed in the global expansion of capitalism. Yet 
Asia was also mobilized by multiple social imaginaries and enlisted in the 
imperialist projects of the United States and Japan, as well as by various 
anticolonial movements, alliances, and revolutions. In an important sense, 
we inherit this historical terrain, full of the past’s contradictions, tensions, 
and mixed legacies as still-living forces to be contended with in the current 
global conjuncture. Ours is a moment, of course, marked by the reasser-
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tion of U.S./Western global hegemony and the occupation of Iraq, as well 
as by the commemoration and revival of the five-decade-old dream of the 
Bandung spirit and the first formation of the East Asia Summit.2 Thus the 
challenge today is that while we cannot escape rethinking the question of 
Asia, we also can neither reduce Asia to certain Western historical imagi-
naries nor invoke an essential, ontologically pure Asia as self-evident, self-
sufficient, and self-made.
The dramatic rise of new regional networks and discourses emerging 
in Asia and beyond presents another imperative for rethinking Asia today. 
Since the ending of the Cold War era, the growth of these efforts — what 
Tani E. Barlow in this collection calls “reregionalization” — does not point 
to a single imaginary or identity, but intersects with various contradictions 
and historical problems both old and new. While the Cold War may have 
ended as an official era, it has not ended as a reality, as the Thirty-Eighth 
Parallel dividing the two Koreas indicates.3 Less stark but no less the prod-
ucts of the global Cold War, albeit in new forms, are the transformation 
of the Taiwan issue into a “new world order” conflict of “democracy,” the 
Japanese right-wing politicians’ brazen commemoration of its Second World 
War criminals, the mutation of the Taliban in Afghanistan from Washing-
ton’s “freedom fighters” to its “terrorists,” and so on. Hence Asia doubles 
as the old frontier of an incomplete Cold War and as the home of what 
Washington calls the “axis of evil,” the center stage for the open-ended war 
on “terror.” But we should note here that our inclusion of West and Central 
Asia in this introduction runs the risk of an Asian expansionism, as it is 
questionable whether people in these regions see themselves as part of Asia 
or as Asians, as the Asia-signifier circulates mainly in East Asia and North 
America. And yet our intent here is to disrupt the euphoria over Asia in 
certain quarters and to suggest that if Asians — and Asianists — were to 
take this name and traditional cartography seriously, they should register 
the occupation of parts of Asia.
Intersecting with these discourses are networks that have grown out of 
the post – Cold War era market expansion and that now link various parts 
of the Asian continent in new ways. Note, for example, the group called 
the Shanghai Six (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan) and its attempts to coordinate the political and economic inter-
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ests of central Asia in order to strengthen a regional position in the North-
dominated neoliberal empire. The accelerating trade between China and 
India, whose economies are predicted to make up half of the global economy 
by 2050, has given rise to the talk about the “Chindia” effect, the “Chindia” 
region, and think-tanks such as the India-China Project and the China-
India Project.4 The ongoing negotiations for an “ASEAN plus three” (i.e., 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, plus Korea, China, and Japan) 
promote greater regional integration through inter-Asian flows of capital, 
resources, and labor. At the same time, Asia has also increasingly become 
the qualifier of a new media-scape (e.g., the Asia Times and Satellite Televi-
sion Asia Region [STAR] TV) that nurtures a translocal Asian subjectivity. 
As Leo Ching has noted, these reregionalization processes form new con-
ditions for “economic production and symbolic reproduction under global 
capitalism,” which moves apace with “Asianness” abstracted and manifested 
as “a commodity-image-sound” circulating globally.5  Hence, in addition to 
doubling as sites of the Cold War and the war on terror, Asia has become 
the most dynamic center of global capitalism. With its precarious situation 
and mixed legacies, Asia is a bundle of contradictions and is thus gathering 
divergent imaginaries that attempt to shape the region’s future in relation to 
the United States – led neoliberal empire.
If the above two imperatives suggest the need to return to the project 
of rethinking Asia, the new Great Game in the making makes this all the 
more compelling. The escalating, manufactured conflict over Iran’s nuclear 
capability reveals a “new” Great Game in the struggle of the United States 
and the European Union to control Western/Central Asia, arguably in large 
part to contain China.6 Iran is central to the Asian Energy Security Grid, 
critical for Russia, China, and India. In the wake of the regime change 
in Afghanistan and the U.S. occupation of Iraq, Iran — part of President 
George Bush’s infamous “axis of evil” — is subjected to similar demands 
and pressures that the United States and European Union deployed to bring 
Iraq to its knees. Aijaz Ahmad pinpoints the heart of the problem: “If Iran 
goes, the Asian Energy Security Grid goes. Iran is quite justified in pointing 
out that the battle over Iran is, in fact, a battle for securing Asian sovereignty 
against expansionist imperialism.”7 Yet, with the Indian political leadership 
voting against Iran (seduced by the dream of “big power” status offered by 
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the United States), the strengthening of security and defense collaboration 
between the United States and Japan through their 2005 joint statement, 
and the Chinese government’s endorsements of the U.S. occupation of Iraq 
and the provisional Iraqi government, we must ask whether “Asian sov-
ereignty,” like “the third world” in past decades, is a fragile concept that 
falls prey to its own disarticulation and fragmentation. Is there potential in 
devising a concept of Asian sovereignty to mobilize against a chauvinistic 
and self-interested regionalism that promotes Asianization (the “rediscovery 
of Asia by Asians”) as a mere simulation of the American Dream?8 
And yet what is emerging on the horizon to undermine European 
Union – United States global hegemony is not only China or Asia, but new 
economic exchanges and political alliances within the global South that are 
potentially fermenting a new global order. Ravi Palat interprets the manu-
facturing of the Iranian nuclear crisis in the nascent context of growing 
cooperation and ties among states in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, and 
a shift in global financial flows: the Group of Twenty led by Brazil, China, 
India, and South Africa; the alliance between Cuba and Venezuela and the 
growing political resistance of Latin America against its northern counter-
part; Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez’s resource outreach to Asia and 
poor neighborhoods in North America; growing Afro-Asia ties; and U.S. 
dependence on Asia to balance its colossal current account deficit.9 Fifty 
years after the Afro-Asia Conference in Bandung, there seems to be at least 
some potential and real resources for asserting the autonomy of the global 
South. Placed in this context, the United States’ and European Union’s 
attempt to subjugate Iran is not just to contain Asian sovereignty and China, 
but also to contain the growing political and economic formation of a global 
South. Hence, rethinking Asia as a signifier for critical regionalism becomes 
compelling in light of this nascent geopolitical formation. 
What intellectual resources are there to help us rethink Asia today? 
Rethinking Asia has been a leitmotif of progressive forums such as Criti-
cal Asian Studies (formerly Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars), positions, 
and other U.S. journals. The efforts to rethink Asia in these journals have 
sought to foster ethical scholarship and pedagogy that critique the making 
and remaking of “areas,” whose boundaries are literally drawn along lines 
of U.S. military deployments and market connections. The recent reregion-
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alizing networks in Asia have also generated new historical critiques, anti-
capitalist regional imaginaries, and social movements. Intellectual networks 
connecting East Asia with South and Southeast Asia are now the most pro-
ductive of discourses on Asia. Among them are the emergence of working 
groups and publications like Inter-Asian Cultural Studies: Asia’s New Cen-
tury from Japan, or Creation and Criticism from Korea; the interdisciplinary 
and interregional research group ARENA (Asian Regional Exchange for 
New Alternatives); the post-9/11, movement-based Asian Peace Alliance; the 
Asia-Pacific – based network Focus on the Global South; and the emergence 
of transnational and interregional alliances and groups focused on the envi-
ronment, gender and sexuality, and labor. Cross-fertilization between left-
wing intellectuals based in Asia and their counterparts in North America 
has been an ongoing process. Growing out of these exchanges are new theo-
rizations of Asia. For example, Chen Kuan-Hsing takes Asia as a “method” 
in order to critique Taiwan’s “leaving Asia and joining America,” to undo 
the West as epistemological and political problematic, and to create alterna-
tive frameworks of reference and identification (of inter-Asia, as opposed to 
the West-and-Asia).10 Wang Hui offers a genealogy of past social imaginar-
ies of Asia and argues that Asia offers an opportunity to reconstruct “world 
history” and to develop analyses of Asia that refuse the double-bind of Euro-
centrism and Asia-centrism and that imagine Asia as an unfinished project 
of emancipation.11 Brij Tankha’s and Madhavi Thampi’s Narratives of Asia 
searches for earlier interregional connections that are elided and distorted 
by colonialism, but are coming into a new formation of Asia.12 Reflecting on 
the intertwined histories between China and Japan, Sun Ge approaches Asia 
as an interspace for the production of a reflexive and decentered subject.13
Informed by this cross-fertilization, “What’s Left of Asia” aims to fore-
ground Asia as a line of inquiry that serves two interrelated purposes. We 
work from a position between critiques of area studies in North America 
and discourses that renegotiate regionalization now under way in Asia 
and beyond. In the current geopolitical context, avoiding the question of 
Asia — of how it means, and the work that it does or could do — is not an 
option. Asia’s transformation from frontier of the anticommunist Cold War 
to the dual site of global capitalist development and the battlegrounds of the 
war on terror implicates area studies in North America. U.S. area studies 
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on Asia are themselves witnessing a dual process of reregulation by national 
and security interests preoccupied with U.S. hegemony and a certain trans-
formation required by global governance tied with certain interests of trans-
national capital.14 At the same time, a post – Cold War reregionalization 
process is beginning to transform Asia, often with the active participation of 
global governance institutions like the United Nations and the World Bank. 
We suggest that neither the U.S.-based critiques of area studies, nor Asia-
based discussions of Asia, can be self-adequate for rethinking Asia.
Second, we seek in this inquiry to point toward that which remains left 
over from, or cannot be assimilated into, the dominant political frameworks 
currently structuring the world — e.g., conservative ideologies of regional-
ism and neoliberal economics and its forms of global governance. Such inas-
similable entities might include progressive scholarship, but perhaps more 
important are the popular cultural effusions, social movements, contested 
histories, and other texts that our contributors have analyzed here. Although 
the essays in this collection approach Asia in varying ways and in differ-
ing historical and geopolitical contexts, collectively they represent renewed 
efforts in exploring the possibilities of transforming and radicalizing Asia.
Nearly three decades after Edward Said’s Orientalism, the discourse of 
civilization has mustered renewed support in the recent war on terror. Fol-
lowing in the steps of Samuel Huntington’s 1993 article on the “Clash of 
Civilizations,” the idea of empire — condemned to political and moral bank-
ruptcy five decades ago by global waves of decolonization — is summoned 
back by Niall Ferguson and his backers to legitimize an open imperial ambi-
tion. If this nakedly imperialist concept of civilization flags itself for criti-
cism by cultural studies and critical area studies, what about the more quiet 
running of the civilizational/culturalist worldview whose hegemony often 
goes unnoticed and unchallenged? In a recent seminar session taught by one 
of the guest editors, students were asked to discuss Huntington’s  “Clash of 
Civilizations” as well his “Hispanic Challenge.” Huntington’s civilizational-
ist premises of global politics is of a piece with his culturalist understanding 
of the making of U.S. capitalist growth. Students, including some graduate 
and undergraduate students, were quick to point out the racist implications of 
Huntington’s thesis. But when asked whether they knew any interpretation 
of global and national history that offers an alternative to the civilizational/ 
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culturalist perspective propounded by Huntington, almost all of them were 
at a loss. If this instance indicates a problem in our educational system, it 
is time to make that unfashionable assertion about political economy as the 
necessary and inextricable premise for discourse. It is in this context that 
we can particularly appreciate Andre Gunder Frank’s uncompromised and 
impassioned writing in our issue against civilizationalist discourse through 
a political economy of the world system.
Much of the history of Asia continues to be narrated in terms and tropes 
derived from the European Enlightenment. Named the East Asian Miracle, 
the recent discourse of Asian capitalism supplements and sustains — rather 
than challenges — the civilizationalist mystification of what Frank calls 
“European exceptionalism.” To implode this myth, Frank approaches the 
trajectory of Asia through a structuralist examination of the world history 
of Afro-Eurasia. The China-centered silver-based global trading system was 
undermined and destroyed by the ascendancy of a Europe that, through 
force, appropriated “free” slave labor from Africa and “free” silver and 
land from the Americas. While one might take issue with what seems to 
be a location-determinism in Frank’s thesis — that location in the historical 
world system determines a region’s success — his world-historical account 
rubbishes the discourse of civilizations and Western exceptionalism as the 
motors of history.
Debating the decline and resurgence of Asia is indeed critical to the 
world history of capitalism. The European “discovery” of capitalism, of its 
miraculous, autochthonous birth in Europe, is still far from being displaced. 
Alternative, critical examinations of Asia’s place in historical capitalism may 
set off a chain-revolution in both European and world history. Giovanni 
Arrighi’s examination of the history of Asian decline and renaissance in 
the world system achieves this very significance. Rather than focusing, as 
Frank does, on circulation and location as the vantage point to examine 
the shifts in the world system, Arrighi pursues an analysis of geopolitical 
environment, particularly the interstate system, that he sees as critical to the 
great divergence between the industrious revolution embarked on by the 
China-centered world region and the Industrial Revolution developed in 
Western Europe. 
The thesis of the nineteenth-century divergence suggests that the China-
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centered world region found itself in a “Smithian high-level equilibrium 
trap,” embarked on a labor-absorbing and resource-saving industrious revo-
lution, and focused on a self-centered development with more state-making, 
short-distance trade, and greater division of labor within households and 
microregions. Western Europe took a different route: it escaped the Smithian 
high-level equilibrium trap, embarked on overseas empire-building, war-
making, and long-distance trade, created core regions and overseas periph-
eral regions, and had a labor-saving, land/resource-absorbing Industrial Rev-
olution. Arrighi emphasizes that military superiority is critical to Europe’s 
process — “successful pursuit of power within the system [depends on] 
accesses to resources . . . outside the system” — and decisive for the revolu-
tion in capital-good industries. Pushing this thesis further, Arrighi analyzes 
what shaped and enabled the great divergence between the China-centered 
world region and Western Europe. This leads to a fundamental question: 
with greater market density in China and with capitalist organizations pres-
ent both there and in Western Europe, why did capitalism become articu-
lated at the level of state in Europe while it had an interstitial and external 
existence in the China-centered world region? The questions of state, inter-
state systems, and the relation between state and market are brought into 
Arrighi’s reconstructed history of capitalism and the two divergent patterns 
of development. While the development of the world regions saw conver-
gence and hybridization in the twentieth century, the grave challenge we 
face in the recent China-led “Asian renaissance” is its convergence from an 
energy-saving to an energy-consuming path of development. Whither Asia? 
How can difference be made and alternative development strategies nur-
tured by lessons drawn from these reconstructed world histories of Asia, 
Europe, and capitalism? What is more clear is that this is a challenge we can 
no longer afford to ignore.
The possibilities entailed by rethinking Asia preoccupy Tani E. Barlow’s 
demonstration that there are ways to rearticulate the politics of gender and 
the sexed division of labor to foster other routes of reregionalization. The 
strategic questions here are how do we identify and register the visibility of 
the sexed, “Asian” division of labor, and what possibilities have emerged to 
move global governance away from neoliberalism. These strategic questions 
could be entertained if we give up the rigid distinction between scholarship 
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and policy. The essay issues warnings and hope in a dialectical manner: 
“Gender, in the context of reregionalization, has emerged as a unifying ele-
ment in the ideology of global governance, along with the human-rights 
regime and the cosmopolitan efforts to salvage the environment.” The 
imposition of the interests of neoliberal capital on women and gender (via 
governance ideology) renders them categories of indenture. Yet it is also 
Barlow’s argument that our political imaginations need not surrender to 
this imposition, but need to grasp the potential in the rhetorical opening 
of “women in Asia.” As a category in the “UN matrix” that travels and 
circulates, gender has to reveal itself as a highly problematic, contested term, 
even while it continues to discipline and unify. Asia, as a qualifier, may be a 
lever to open up complex practices and theorizations about sexed difference 
that cannot be easily subsumed to global governance. It is by grasping this 
potential that “Asia scholarship and praxes have much to offer.”
Yiman Wang is interested in the links between mediascapes and Asia 
and investigates what transformative potentials exist in the sphere of popu-
lar culture. Wang’s historical examination shows the ignominious imagin-
ings of Asia in Japan’s Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere, in Holly-
wood Orientalism, and in the post-1980s New Asia discourse, and shows 
further that each incarnation of Asia on the silver screen has depended on 
the performative “border-crossing” translations of actresses. If Anna May 
Wong and Yamaguchi Yoshiko had been ignored or subsumed in previous 
representations of Asia (and in film studies), Wang suggests that Maggie 
Cheung’s border-crossing performance indicates a certain palpable and non-
reified moment of indigestibility of “localized agency.” Today such localized 
agency could offer potential for a different reenacting of Asia because the 
Asia-Pacific is itself a self-differentiating and enabling contact zone. In the 
general context of Asia as a market and Asian-ness as commodity in the 
regional and global capitalist economy, Wang sensitizes us to affective per-
formance and mobilization, including their transformative potential and 
politics that cannot always be reduced to the logic of the market.15
Tobias Hübinette’s commentary in this collection takes us on an unex-
pected tour: through Asia’s operation as a compulsive, contradictory “topos 
of fear and desire” for Nazi and right-wing Asia scholars in Sweden. A scru-
tiny of this historical and unknown terrain reveals mutations and continuity 
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in the operation of Orientalism: in 1930s Europe, fear of Asia reinforced 
a phobia against Jews as “internal Orientals”; in the Cold War, commu-
nism was linked with Oriental despotism and the “yellow peril” and “Red 
menace”; in the war on terror, terror originates from the “barbarity of the 
Orient.” As if in sync with the mutation of Orientalism, fascism has found 
renewed employment in the anticommunist agenda of the Cold War and 
the post – Cold War “end of history” crusade for democracy.
Urs Matthias Zachmann in this collection revisits the vexed problematic 
of Asia for Meiji Japan. In a close, defamiliarizing reading of the classic and 
disseminative debate between Okakura Tenshin and Fukuzawa Yukichi, 
Zachmann argues against the dominant reading that they are, in fact, polar 
opposites, representing Westernization and pan-Asianism that, in turn, 
combine to form a perfect “double portrait” of Meiji intellectual history. As 
suggested in this essay, it is still the European subject who speaks through 
this too handy and dualistic schema. Underpinning the binary of “leaving 
Asia/joining Asia” lies Fukuzawa and Okakura’s shared vision of Japanese 
transcendence over the Orientalist locations of the East and West and their 
mutual support for Japan’s war with China as Japan’s necessary self-expression 
as an independent sovereign subject. These classic debates, then, are less 
about some real East/West opposition than about a nationalist expression of 
discontent with the new global episteme. The metaphysical desire for tran-
scendence, articulated through an imperialist logic, only propelled Japan 
physically and violently into Asia, to confront Europe by mastering Asia. 
Drawing on Zachmann, it may be proposed that Asia is a problematic for 
Meiji intellectuals because the sign of Asia slides between the transcendental 
self (embodied by Japan) and what is left over, the other embodied by the 
rest of Asia. Reading Zachmann in the current context of the continuing 
problem of Asia for Japan, we also need to ask how intellectual history is 
accountable to history proper.16 Can intellectual history as an approach to 
history (about the Meiji era or otherwise) account for the split between the 
violent processes of abstraction and reification (the transcendent, imperialist 
self) and that which is left over from or resists these same processes (what is 
left of Asia after such violence)? 
Yet the logic embedded in Asia as a problematic is not unique to Japan. 
Haven’t we seen this split or violent hierarchy reproduced in various places 
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even after decolonization? The stellar performance of (East) Asia in global 
capitalism has not enabled a beneficent or progressive Asia or regionalism, 
but has perhaps trapped it in the slave’s “existential impasse” in relationship 
to the master.17 The split found in Asia today, between development and 
poverty or between self-interest and responsibility, invokes two opposing 
figures: the hyper models of development in the developed, urban parts of 
Asia, and the disavowed, rural third world of China, India, et al. This Asia 
has reproduced the exploitative and violent relationship between core and 
peripheries within the region and in each society, and has excluded and 
elided other, possible Asias.
It is the very problem of violence, metaphysical, modern, and otherwise, 
that Han Yuhai unravels through his analysis of the historical relationship 
between speech and writing in the Chinese language. Following Marx, 
Nietzsche, and Lu Xun, Han argues that “metaphysical inversion,” or the 
social process of abstraction, is the secret of social domination and consti-
tutes the domination of writing over speech, of abstract labor over concrete 
labor and exchange-value over use-value, and of the modern state as the 
abstract, imagined community over historical, multifaceted, and “local” 
communities. The law of value in the capitalist market economy and the 
juridical system of the modern state — the backbones of modern civiliza-
tion — are founded upon this metaphysical violence. The process of com-
munity consciousness-forming in China, on the other hand, and including 
popular insurrections such as the Taiping and Boxer Rebellions and the 
Maoist social revolution, were transformative social practices that were not 
founded on the metaphysical reversal. Thus, collective consciousness forma-
tion did not depend on an abstract, graphocentric standardization of lan-
guage, but was mobilized through the creative syntheses of regional variet-
ies of speech, folk culture forms, and the common vernacular. Noting that 
“metaphysical inversion” also lies within the very formation of “the world” 
as an object of knowledge, Han warns us that the “Orient” or “Asia” is a 
similar construction; particular speech, cultures, and communities fit within 
this rubric only as homologous entities, “much as potatoes in a sack form a 
sack of potatoes” (Marx). The current fantasy of the new “Asian commu-
nity” and the rewriting of world history in the name of Asia runs the risk 
of falling into the same metaphysics underpinning the modern world sys-
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tem. If we need to have a rethinking of Asia today, Han (following Jacques 
Derrida) seems to suggest that this must move in the direction of “a new 
international,” though presumably without the abstract, Derridean fear of 
taking positions.
 The unsettled historical toll of Japan’s self-Europeanization in the last 
century, and the newly professed ambition for an Asianization of “the 
American dream” in the new century, continue to call forth the necessity 
of a critical regionalism and a reorientation of thought that can resist and 
provide alternatives to neoliberalism and empire within and across Asia 
and the world.  Counterposing the neoliberal empire as well as these Asia 
operations, Asia, for Gayatri Spivak in this collection, is a position without 
identity, and one that could facilitate a nonidentitarian, critical regionalism. 
The challenge is how to take such a position and produce such a politics 
collectively and how to think and work on Asia in a way that takes it as 
neither subject or object nor origin or end. To ask “what’s left of Asia” is to 
radically question Asia but without negating it. It is to make more thinkable 
and visible Asian legacies of resistances, revolutions, and historical forms 
of consciousness that cannot be abstracted and reinscribed into the current 
geopolitical order. 
We would like to close this introduction with a question and possible 
future line of inquiry that these articles implicitly raise. If Asia cannot be 
an end in itself, then there is ultimately no good reason why Asia, mediated 
through a reconstructed world history, cannot be articulated to a new inter-
national of the global South that is located both inside and outside Asia. 
How, then, can scholarship and social movements move the cartographically 
burdened concept of Asia toward this new international?
Yan Hairong and Daniel Vukovich, Guest Editors
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